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The importance of economic growth cannot be overstated. In-
come growth is essential for achieving economic, social, and even
political development. Countries that grow strongly and for sustained
periods of time are able to reduce their poverty levels significantly,
strengthen their democratic and political stability, improve the qual-
ity of their natural environment, and even diminish the incidence of
crime and violence.1 Economic growth is not a panacea; but it greatly
facilitates the implementation of public programs that complement
its effects and correct its deficiencies, even if its direct beneficial
impacts are modest.
 It comes as no surprise, then, that an enormous amount of talent
and effort has been invested in understanding the process of economic
growth. The recent surge in academic research on endogenous growth
and the policy preoccupation with poverty-alleviating growth are just
two examples indicating that economic growth is a focal point in re-
search and policy circles.
The present collection of studies contributes to this literature on
two dimensions. First, it provides a systematic account of the styl-
ized facts that characterize economic growth and, in particular, of
the role that policies play in fostering periods of sustained growth.
Some of the papers revisit the question of what drives long-run eco-
nomic growth, drawing on new and improved data, while others2 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
analyze the consequences that growth has on various aspects of de-
velopment and welfare. These studies share a concern for identify-
ing the most efficient policies to promote or facilitate growth. They
thus critically analyze a broad spectrum of policies, such as finan-
cial development, public infrastructure, regulatory framework, and
direct government intervention in industrial policies. Second, the
papers in this volume focus on new and potentially crucial questions
regarding the intricate relationship between economic growth and
cyclical fluctuations, particularly whether business cycles have pro-
longed effects on long-run growth.
The studies included in the volume apply to most countries, par-
ticularly in the developing world. Some studies, however, provide spe-
cific applications to Chile or use this country for illustration of general
issues. Moreover, Chile’s experience may be of independent interest to
scholars and policymakers, in that it provides an example of a develop-
ing country that suffered protracted stagnation (in the 1970s) and then
conducted successful economic reforms (in the 1980s and 1990s).
1. RECENT TRENDS
Growth performance has varied notably across regions and coun-
tries in the last four decades; in some economies, it has also experienced
major shifts over time. For the world as a whole, the rate of growth of per
capita output has followed a declining path since the 1960s (see figures 1
and 2 and table 1).2 To some extent, this reflects the trend in industrial-
ized countries and its influence on developing economies. There are, how-
ever, some notable differences across geographic regions. The economic
growth rates in East Asia and the Pacific were not only among the high-
est but also the most stable of all developing economies, showing a steady
increase in the 1970s and 1980s and only a mild decline in the 1990s.
South Asia also had a relatively successful growth experience in the last
two decades, achieving rates of per capita output growth beyond 3 per-
cent per year with remarkable stability.
Other regions have had rather unsatisfactory growth performances.
The economic growth rates of Eastern Europe and Central Asia ex-
hibit the fastest decline from the 1960s onward; the negative rates in
2. When comparing per capita growth rates over long periods of time, changes
in demographic factors can distort the conclusions. We nevertheless use per capita
GDP figures—as opposed to per worker GDP or per family income—to maintain
comparability with the rest of the literature.Figure 1. Growth Rates of GDP per Capita, GDP-Weighted
Average by Region, 1961-1999 (constant sample)
Figure 2. Coefficient of Variation of GDP per Capita,
GDP-Weighted Average by Region, 1961-1999 (constant sample)4 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
the 1990s reveal the high costs of adjustment from planned to market
economies. Sub-Saharan Africa shares some interesting features with
the Middle East and North Africa: both regions had similar growth
rates in the 1960s, and both experienced a large decline in growth
rates in the 1970s and 1980s. The Middle East and North Africa re-
covered to positive growth rates in the 1990s, but sub-Saharan Africa
continued its downward spiral. Not only did sub-Saharan Africa suf-
fer from negative average growth in the last two decades, but its growth
performance was also the most volatile in the world. Meager growth
and high volatility in Africa appear to be the result of an unfortunate
combination of poor policies and negative external shocks on these
resource-dependent economies. For Latin America and the Caribbean,
the 1960s and 1970s were decades of moderate but stable growth rates.
This situation changed in the 1980s, when the growth rate of per
capita output fell to negative values and its volatility increased nota-
bly. In the 1990s, economic growth became positive again but did not
recover its pre-1980s level.
The countries within each region display some interesting dispari-
ties as well as common features. Consider, for instance, the case of
Latin America in the last decades (see table 2). The large majority of
Latin American countries experienced negative growth rates in the
1980s. The only exceptions were Chile and Colombia, and for good rea-
sons. Up to the 1980s, Colombia was the country with the best record of
Table 1. Growth Rates of per Capita GDP by Region, 1961–1999a
Percent
Period
Region Observations 1961–1970 1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–1999
All countries  109 4.15 2.68 2.29 1.72
Industrial countries  21 4.28 2.50 2.42 1.48
Developing countries
East Asia and the Pacific  14 3.58 4.90 5.88 5.44
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 4 5.92 3.94 1.73 –3.80
Latin America and the Caribbean  26 2.71 3.44 –0.74 2.05
Middle East and North Africa 9 4.11 4.00 –0.86 0.94
South Asia 5 1.72 0.64 3.40 3.23
Sub-Saharan Africa  30 2.68 1.08 –1.00 –0.58
Source: World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.
a. GDP-weighted average growth rate by region. Sample is constant over time.5 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
macroeconomic stability and external credit worthiness in the region,
and this played to the country’s advantage in the turmoil of the debt
crisis that characterized the decade. Chile, on the contrary, did not
enjoy such status, and it suffered a deep banking crisis and, conse-
quently, a large fall in output in the first part of the 1980s. This
country, however, found its way back to growth starting in the sec-
ond half of the decade, after substantial reforms in the financial sec-
tor allowed the economy to reap the benefits of the market-oriented
reforms started in the 1970s. Mexico was hit by similar shocks and
had a similar crisis but chose to delay paying the costs of reform,
inevitably postponing its recovery.3
For most of Latin America, the 1990s was a decade of reform and
recovery. Except for Paraguay and (surprisingly) Colombia, all countries
3. For a comparative analysis of the debt crisis and its aftermath, see Bergoeing
and others (2002).




Region and country 1961–1970 1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–1999
Southern Cone
Argentina 2.31 1.32 –2.99 3.72
Brazil 3.18 5.75 –0.42 1.07
Chile 1.82 1.22 2.08 5.00
Paraguay 1.79 5.69 –0.30 –0.60
Uruguay 0.36 2.60 –0.66 2.70
Andean Community
Bolivia 0.35 1.67 –1.95 1.53
Colombia 2.21 3.05 1.26 0.72
Ecuador 1.24 5.65 –0.47 –0.43
Peru 2.31 0.84 –2.99 2.32
Venezuela 1.46 –0.76 –1.75 –0.30
Central America
Costa Rica 1.93 2.75 –0.32 3.48
El Salvador 2.15 –0.18 –1.47 2.67
Guatemala 2.56 2.87 –1.62 1.43
Honduras 1.52 2.06 –0.73 0.12
Mexico 3.37 3.58 –0.29 1.42
Nicaragua 3.36 –2.84 –4.07 0.33
Panama 4.70 1.47 –0.71 2.80
Source: World Development Indicators and authors’ calculations.6 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
in Latin America underwent an increase in growth rates in the 1990s
relative to the previous decade. The improvement was quite notable in
Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Uruguay, and
Mexico. These countries have in common that they conducted strong
market-oriented reforms and accomplished processes of economic and
political stabilization. Only in a few instances, however—Argentina, Chile,
Costa Rica, and El Salvador—did the recovery of the 1990s result in
economic growth rates that surpassed those of the 1960s and 1970s.
The 1980s was thus a lost decade for growth and socioeconomic
development in many countries and almost entire regions. The 1990s
started with high expectations as it witnessed economic reforms in many
places around the world, particularly in Latin America. It was a de-
cade full of promise, and, all in all, the performance of reforming coun-
tries was not disappointing. Toward the end of the decade, however,
some worrisome signs threatened to spoil the growth excitement. Re-
peated international crises, cases of interrupted reforms, and instances
of macroeconomic mismanagement led to severe economic downturns
in a number of countries around the world at the start of the new
century. For policymakers, particularly in developing economies, one
of the most pressing questions is how their countries can find or re-
cover the path of high and sustained growth.
Fortunately, the task of identifying the keys to economic growth
does not necessitate the launching of a new research venture. The
economics profession has inherited a vast and rich literature. The
objective of this volume is to contribute to that literature by exploring
some of the issues that are most relevant to developing countries in
the present context.
2. THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW GROWTH LITERATURE
In the 1950s, Robert Solow and Trevor Swan revitalized the study
of economic growth by modeling it as the result of factor accumulation
in the medium term and as the outcome of technological progress in
the long run. Despite its parsimony, the Solow-Swan model was rich in
conclusions and practical implications. Some of these were examined
empirically, particularly in the United States, as exemplified by the
work of Dale Jorgenson and research associates. However, academic
interest in economic growth dwindled and gradually turned to the study
of business cycles and stabilization policies.
After about twenty-five years, interest in economic growth studies
was rekindled for a number of reasons, of which we highlight two.7 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
First, the use of new theoretical tools allowed researchers to model
growth paths as a result of dynamic, intertemporal optimization. Sec-
ond, the development of new and more reliable databases facilitated
cross-country comparisons of per capita income levels and growth rates.
The databases generated by Summers and Heston and by the World
Bank helped researchers check the sometimes ethereal economic theo-
ries against reality.
The new literature on economic growth starts precisely as a reac-
tion to the apparent shortcomings of the neoclassical model in explain-
ing some actual facts. At least in its simplest forms, the neoclassical
model implies that owing to diminishing returns, poorer economies
should grow faster than richer ones. It further predicts that the return
differentials generated by large gaps in capital stocks would produce
massive capital flows from richer to poorer countries. Both implica-
tions are strongly rejected by the evidence.
The weakness of the neoclassical growth model led several research-
ers to propose alternatives. Paul Romer (1986) presents a model in which
economic growth in the long run occurs not because of exogenous tech-
nological progress, but because the accumulation of capital generates
externalities that compensate for diminishing returns. Robert Lucas
(1988), another pioneer of the new growth literature, introduces a model
in which human capital plays a fundamental role in perpetuating eco-
nomic growth and preventing diminishing returns to physical capital
accumulation. Lucas opens his 1988 article with the now famous words,
“Once one starts to think about [the human welfare consequences of
economic growth], it is hard to think about anything else.” These were
premonitory words judging by the large number of talented people who,
in the years to follow, devoted their energies to describing the stylized
facts of economic growth, deciphering its theoretical puzzles, and pro-
posing public policies to promote and support it.
The paper by Xavier Sala-i-Martin in this volume is devoted to re-
viewing the main contributions of the new growth literature. Sala-i-Martin
identifies three defining characteristics of this literature. They are, first,
the empirical touch, that is, the close connection between the new theo-
ries and the empirical data and methods used to test them; second, the
emphasis on endogenous technological progress, in particular on the type
that generates increasing returns and is provided by the market through
monopolistic competition; and third, the merging of different strands of
economics, which is both a feature of the new growth literature and a
consequence of it. One particular example is the fruitful interaction,
induced by economic growth, between macroeconomics—previously8 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
dominated by business cycle theories—and economic development—for-
merly centered on institutional analysis and economic planning. Sala-i-
Martin’s article derives its authoritative perspective partly from his work
on the already classic textbook on economic growth that he coauthored
with Robert Barro (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
3. DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH4
As an introduction to the study of growth determinants, which is
the common thread of the papers in this volume, we now estimate an
encompassing model of economic growth. We follow the largest strand
of the empirical endogenous-growth literature, which seeks to link a
country’s economic growth rate to economic, political, and social vari-
ables using a large sample of countries and time periods.5 Although
our interpretation of the results accords with the mainstream of the
literature, we acknowledge the caveats on this type of exercise pointed
out by Steven Durlauf, whose study is included in the volume and
discussed below.
3.1 Setup
We estimate the following variation of a growth regression:
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where y is the log of per capita output, yT represents the trend compo-
nent of per capita output, (yit–1 – yT
it–1) is the output gap at the start of
the period, X is a set variables postulated as growth determinants, µ t is
a period-specific effect, η i represents unobserved country-specific fac-
tors, and ε  is the regression residual. The subscripts i and t refer to
country and time period, respectively (for simplicity, the length of the
time period is normalized to 1). The expression on the left-hand side of
the equation is the growth rate of per capita output in a given period.
On the right-hand side, the regression equation includes the level of
per capita output at the start of the period (to account for transitional
convergence) and a set of explanatory variables measured during the
same period. The inclusion of the output gap as an explanatory vari-
able allows us to control for cyclical output movements and thus to
4. This section is based on Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón (2002).
5. See, for example, Barro (1991, 1999); King and Levine (1993).9 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
differentiate between transitional convergence and cyclical reversion.
The time-specific effect, µ t, allows us to control for international condi-
tions that change over time and affect the growth performance of all
countries in the sample. The term η i accounts for unobserved country-
specific factors that both drive growth and are potentially correlated
with the explanatory variables.
3.2 Growth Determinants
A large variety of economic and social variables can be proposed as
determinants of economic growth. We focus on the variables that have
received the most attention in the academic literature and in policy
circles. These variables can be divided into five groups: transitional
convergence, cyclical reversion, structural policies and institutions,
stabilization policies, and external conditions (see appendix A for de-
tails on definitions and sources).
Transitional convergence
One of the main implications of the neoclassical growth model,
and indeed of all models that exhibit transitional dynamics, is that
the growth rate depends on the initial position of the economy.6 The
“conditional convergence” hypothesis maintains that, ceteris paribus,
poor countries should grow faster than rich ones because of decreasing
returns to scale in production . We control for the initial position of
the economy by including the initial level of real per capita GDP in
the set of explanatory variables.
Cyclical reversion
Although our main objective is to account for long-run trends in
economic growth, in practice, we work with relatively short time
periods (five- or ten-year averages) for both econometric estimation and
forecasts. At these frequencies, cyclical effects are bound to play a role.
We include some explanatory variables that are not standard in the
long-run growth literature but capture important elements of the
business cycle. One of them deals with cyclical reversion to the long-run
trend. Other cyclical factors are included under the category of stabilization
6. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Turnovsky (2002) for a review.10 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
policies, which is introduced below. We account for cyclical reversion
by including the output gap at the start of each period as a growth
determinant. Apart from improving the regression fit, controlling for
the initial output gap allows us to avoid overestimating the speed of
transitional convergence, which is inferred from the coefficient on ini-
tial per capita output. The output gap used in the regression is ob-
tained as the difference between potential and actual GDP around the
start of the period. We use the Baxter-King filter to decompose GDP
and estimate annual series of potential (trend) and cyclical output for
each country in the sample.
Structural policies and institutions
The underlying theme of the endogenous growth literature is that
the rate of economic growth can be affected by public policies and
institutions. Although there may be disagreement on which policies
are most conducive to growth or on the sequence in which policy changes
must be undertaken, there is no doubt that governments can and do
influence long-run growth in their countries. Theoretical work usu-
ally concentrates on one policy in particular or the combination of a
few policies, whereas empirical work tends to be comprehensive in
the sense of considering a wide array of policy and institutional deter-
minants of growth.7 Given our objective, we also take a comprehen-
sive approach to explaining economic growth performance. Thus, we
consider explanatory variables representing all major categories of
public policies. This subsection focuses on structural policies and in-
stitutions; the next considers stabilization policies. We recognize that
to some extent the separation between structural and stabilization
policies is arbitrary. However, the division helps us examine the trends
and roles of policies directed at growth in the long run from those
related also to cyclical fluctuations.
The first area of structural policies is education, and human capital
formation in general. Human capital can counteract the forces of dimin-
ishing returns in other accumulable factors of production—such as physi-
cal capital—to render long-run growth. Apart from its direct role as a
factor of production, education and human capital can serve as a comple-
ment to other factors such as physical capital and natural resources,
determine the rate of technological innovations in countries that produce
7. See Barro (1991); De Gregorio (1992); Easterly and Rebelo (1993); King and
Levine(1993); Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000).11 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
technology, and facilitate technological absorption in countries that imi-
tate it. We measure the policies directed toward increasing education
and human capital with the rate of gross secondary school enrollment.8
The second policy area is related to financial depth. Well-function-
ing financial systems promote long-run growth. They influence eco-
nomic efficiency and economic growth through different channels. Fi-
nancial markets facilitate risk diversification by trading, pooling, and
hedging financial instruments. They can help identify profitable in-
vestment projects and mobilize savings to them. Moreover, financial
systems can help monitor firm managers and exert corporate controls,
thereby reducing the principal-agent problems that lead to inefficient
investment. Firm-level, industry-level, and cross-country studies pro-
vide ample evidence that financial development leads to higher growth.9
Our measure of financial depth is the ratio of private domestic credit
supplied by private financial institutions to GDP.
The third area of economic policy is international trade openness.
The literature points out five channels through which trade affects
economic growth.10 First, trade leads to higher specialization and, thus
to gains in total factor productivity (TFP), by allowing countries to
exploit their areas of comparative advantage. Second, it expands poten-
tial markets, which allows domestic firms to take advantage of econo-
mies of scale, thus increasing their TFP. Third, trade diffuses both
technological innovations and improved managerial practices through
stronger interactions with foreign firms and markets. Fourth, freer
trade tends to lessen anticompetitive practices of domestic firms. Fi-
nally, trade liberalization reduces the incentives for firms to conduct
rent-seeking activities that are mostly unproductive. The bulk of the
empirical evidence indicates that the relationship between economic
growth and international openness is indeed positive, and that it re-
flects a virtuous cycle by which higher openness leads to growth im-
provement, which, in turn, generates larger trade. Our measure of
openness is the volume of trade (real exports plus imports) over GDP,
adjusted for the size (area and population) of the country, for whether it
is landlocked, and for whether it is an oil exporter.11
8. This is the variable used as a proxy for human capital in Barro (1991),
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), and Easterly (2001).
9. See Levine (1997) for a review of the theoretical foundations of the role of
financial development and a summary of the available macro- and microeconomic
empirical evidence.
10. See Lederman (1996).
11. See Pritchett (1996) for a similar adjustment.12 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
The fourth area is related to the government burden; it focuses on
the drain that government may represent for private activity. Although
government can play a beneficial role for the economy (as discussed
below), it can be a heavy burden if it imposes high taxes, uses this
revenue to maintain ineffective public programs and a bloated bureau-
cracy, distorts markets incentives, and interferes negatively in the
economy by assuming roles most appropriate for the private sector.12
We account for the burden of government through a proxy, namely, the
ratio of government consumption to GDP.
The fifth important area of policy involves the availability of public
services and infrastructure. The importance of productive public ser-
vices in generating long-run growth has been highlighted in the ana-
lytical work of Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), among
others. These papers underscore the channels through which public
services and infrastructure affect economic growth. Whether they are
treated as classic public goods or as subject to congestion, public ser-
vices and infrastructure can affect growth by entering directly as in-
puts of the production function, by serving to improve total factor pro-
ductivity, and by encouraging private investment as they help protect
property rights. In any case, their theoretical importance is well estab-
lished, and recent empirical studies confirm this conclusion.13 There
are a few alternative measures of public services and infrastructure.
Among these, the variables with the largest cross-country and time-
series coverage focus on the provision of infrastructure. Because of data
considerations, we work with telecommunications capacity, measured
by the number of main telephone lines per capita.
The last area is related to governance. This large area comprises
several aspects of the institutional quality of government, including the
respect for civil and political rights, bureaucratic efficiency, absence of
corruption, enforcement of contractual agreements, and prevalence of
law and order. After the seminal work by Mauro (1995) and Knack and
Keefer (1995), governance has received increasing attention as a deter-
minant of economic growth.14 In our regression analysis, we use the first
principal component of four indicators reported by Political Risk Ser-
vices in their publication International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). They
are the indicators on the prevalence of law and order, quality of the
bureaucracy, absence of corruption, and accountability of public officials.
12. See Corden (1991); Fischer (1993).
13. See Loayza (1996); Calderón, Easterly, and Servén (2001).
14. See, for instance, Barro (1996); Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón
(1999b); and the survey in Przeworski and Limongi (1993).13 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
Stabilization policies
Including stabilization policies as determinants of economic growth
is important because the regression’s fit and forecasting power increases
significantly over horizons that are relevant to economic policy (say,
five to ten years). An even more important reason is that stabilization
policies affect not only cyclical fluctuations, but also long-run growth.
In fact an argument can be made that cyclical and trend growth are
interrelated processes (see Fatás, in this volume), which implies that
macroeconomic stabilization and crisis-related variables have an im-
pact both over short horizons and on the long-run performance of the
economy (see Fischer, 1993). Fiscal, monetary, and financial policies
that contribute to a stable macroeconomic environment and avoid fi-
nancial and balance-of-payments crises are thus important for long-
run growth. By reducing uncertainty, they encourage firm investment,
reduce societal disputes for the distribution of ex post rents (for in-
stance between owners and employees in the face of unexpected high
inflation), and allow economic agents to concentrate on productive ac-
tivities (rather than trying to manage high risk).
The first area in this category is related to macroeconomic stabili-
zation policies. This is a vast subject, and we consider two interrelated
effects of fiscal and monetary policies. The first is the lack of price
stability, which we measure by the average inflation rate for the corre-
sponding country and time period. This is a good summary measure of
the quality of fiscal and monetary policies, and it is positively corre-
lated with other indicators of poor macroeconomic policies such as fis-
cal deficits and the black market premium on foreign exchange.15 The
second aspect is the cyclical volatility of GDP, which reflects the lack
of output stability. It is measured by the standard deviation of the output
gap for the corresponding country and period.
The second area is related to external imbalances and the risk of
balance-of-payments crises. This factor is measured by an index of real
exchange rate overvaluation, which is constructed following the meth-
odology in Dollar (1992). Real exchange rate overvaluation captures
the impact of monetary and exchange rate policies that distort the allo-
cation of resources between the exporting and domestic sectors. This
15. The correlation coefficient between the inflation rate and the ratio of
fiscal deficit to GDP and the black-market premium is, respectively, 0.24 and
0.26. The inflation rate is the indicator of macroeconomic stability in many
cross-country growth studies, including Fischer (1993); Easterly, Loayza, and
Montiel (1997); Barro (2001).14 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
misallocation leads to large external imbalances, whose correction
is frequently accompanied by balance-of-payments crises and followed
by sharp recessions.
The third area concerns the occurrence of systemic banking crises
and serves to account for the deleterious effect of financial turmoil on
economic activity, particularly over short and medium horizons. Bank-
ing crises may be the product of an inadequate regulatory framework
for financial transactions, which leads to overlending and unsustain-
able consumption booms. They can also result from monetary and fis-
cal policies that put undue burden on creditors and financial institu-
tions. This is the case, for instance, of monetary policies that are overly
contractionary or fiscal policies that tap scarce domestic financial re-
sources excessively, only to default on debt repayment later on. The
occurrence of banking crises is measured by the fraction of years that a
country undergoes a systemic banking crisis in the corresponding pe-
riod, as identified in Caprio and Klingebiel (1999).
External conditions
A country’s economic activity and growth are shaped not only by
internal factors, but also by external conditions. These have an influ-
ence on the domestic economy in both the short and long runs. There is
ample evidence of transmission of cycles across countries via interna-
tional trade, external financial flows, and investors’ perceptions of the
expected profitability of the global economy.16 Changes in long-run trends
can also be spread across countries. This is achieved through, for ex-
ample, the demonstration effect of economic reforms and the diffusion
of technological progress.17
We take external conditions into account by including two addi-
tional variables in the growth regression: the terms-of-trade shocks
affecting each country individually and a period-specific shift affect-
ing all countries in the sample. Terms-of-trade shocks capture changes
in both the international demand for a country’s exports and the cost
of production and consumption inputs.18 The period-specific shifts (or
time dummy variables) summarize the prevalent global conditions at
a given period of time and reflect worldwide recessions and booms,
16. See Boileau (1996).
17. See Keller (2002).
18. The terms-of-trade shocks variable is important in several empirical stud-
ies on growth, including Easterly and others (1993); Fischer (1993); Easterly,
Loayza and Montiel (1997).15 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
changes in the allocation and cost of international capital flows, and
technological innovations.
3.3 SAMPLE AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
As mentioned above, we estimate a dynamic model of per capita GDP
growth rates using cross-country, time-series panel data. Our sample is
dictated by data availability; it contains seventy-eight countries repre-
senting all major world regions (see appendix B for a complete list). The
regression analysis is conducted using averages of five-year periods. Each
country has a minimum of three and a maximum of eight nonoverlapping
five-year observations spanning the years 1960–1999 (evidently, the
panel is unbalanced). A minimum of three observations per country is
required to run the instrumental variable methodology outlined below.
Since one observation must be reserved for instrumentation, the first
period in the regression corresponds to the years 1966–1970. The total
number of observations is 350.
Our main econometric methodology is the generalized method-of
moments (GMM) estimator developed for dynamic models of panel data,
which was introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano
and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995).19 The growth regres-
sion to be estimated poses three challenges. First, the regression equa-
tion is dynamic in the sense that it represents a lagged-dependent-
variable model. Second, the regression equation includes an unobserved
country-specific effect, which cannot be accounted for by regular meth-
ods (such as the within estimator) given the dynamic nature of the
model. Third, the set of explanatory variables includes some that are
likely to be jointly endogenously determined with the growth rate. The
GMM methodology that we use allows us to control for country-specific
effects and joint endogeneity in a dynamic model of panel data. For
comparison purposes, we also report the results obtained with a simple
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator.
3.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results obtained by estimating the empirical
model. The results obtained with the pooled OLS estimator are quite
19. This methodology has been applied to empirical growth models in, for
instance, Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996); Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000);
Gallego and Loayza (in this volume).Table 3. Determinants of Economic Growth: Panel
Regression Analysisa
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Transitional convergence
Initial per capita GDP –0.0139** –0.0176**
(in logs) (–3.49) (–3.80)
Cyclical reversion
Initial output gap –0.2834** –0.2371**
(log[actual GDP/potential GDP]) (–6.13) (–8.52)
Structural policies and institutions
Education 0.0085** 0.0172**
(secondary enrollment, in logs) (2.52) (6.70)
Financial depth 0.0031 0.0066**
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) (1.57) (4.28)
Trade openness 0.0083** 0.0096**
(structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) (2.67) (3.14)
Government burden –0.0125** –0.0154**
(government consumption/GDP, in logs) (–3.16) (–3.18)
Public infrastructure 0.0073** 0.0071**
(main telephone lines per capita, in logs) (3.08) (2.71)
Governance 0.0012 –0.0012
(first principal component of ICRG indicators) (1.02) (–0.68)
Stabilization policies:
Lack of price stability –0.0085** –0.0048*
(inflation rate, in log [100+inf. rate]) (–2.61) (–1.89)
Cyclical volatility –0.3069** –0.2771**
(standard deviation of output gap) (–3.58) (–3.76)
Real exchange rate overvaluation –0.0080** –0.0061**
(in logs; overvaluation if greater than 100) (–2.71) (–3.90)
Systemic banking crises –0.0171** –0.0289**
(frequency of years under crisis: 0-1) (–3.96) (–7.42)
External conditions:
Terms-of-trade shocks 0.0619** 0.0720**
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similar to those found with the GMM estimator. In what follows, we
concentrate on the latter given its superior properties. The specifica-
tion tests (namely, Sargan and serial-correlation tests) support the GMM
system estimator of our model.
Transitional convergence. The coefficient on the initial level of per
capita GDP is negative and statistically significant. It is consistent
with conditional convergence—that is, holding constant other growth
determinants, poorer countries grow faster than richer ones. Given the
estimated coefficient, the implied speed of convergence is 1.84 percent
per year, with a corresponding half-life of about thirty-eight years (this
is the time it takes for half the income difference between two growing
countries to disappear solely due to convergence).20
Table 3. (continued)
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Summary statistics
No. countries  78  78
No. observations  350  350
Specification tests (P values)
Sargan test 0.996
Serial-correlation test, first-order 0.000 0.000
Serial-correlation test, second-order 0.021 0.461
Source: Authors’ calculations.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
a. The dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP. The estimation method in column 1 is pooled OLS,
while column 4 uses a system GMM estimator. Observations correspond to nonoverlapping five-year periods
spanning the years 1966–1999. T statistics are in parentheses.
b. The benchmark for column 1 is 1971–1975; the benchmark for column 2 is 1966–1970.
20. Linearizing the neoclassical growth model around the steady state, the
annual speed of convergence is given by the formula (–1/T)*ln(1 + Ta), where T
represents the length of each time period (that is, five in the main sample) and a
is the estimated coefficient on initial per capita GDP. The half-life in years is given
by ln(2)/annual speed of convergence. See Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva (1993).
This estimate for the speed of convergence is almost identical to estimates re-
ported in the early cross-country growth regressions (such as Barro, 1991). Previ-
ous panel regressions estimate faster speeds of convergence, claiming that this is
due to their correction of the downward bias produced by unobserved country-
specific effects (see Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva, 1993; Caselli, Esquivel, and
Lefort, 1996). By working with shorter time periods, however, these panel studies
introduced an upward bias owing to cyclical reversion to the trend; for instance, a
post-recession recovery was confused with faster convergence. In this paper we
control for both country-specific effects and cyclical factors, and we find that their
corresponding biases on the speed of convergence nearly cancel each other.18 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
Cyclical reversion. The estimated coefficient on the initial output
gap is negative and significant. This indicates that the economies in
the sample follow a trend-reverting process. In other words, if an economy
is undergoing a recession at the start of the period, it is expected that
its growth rate be higher than otherwise in the following years, so as to
close the output gap. This result is symmetric, such that a cyclical
boom is expected to be followed by lower growth rates. The cyclical
reversion effect is sizable: according to the point estimate, if initial
output is, say, 5 percent below potential output, the economy is ex-
pected to grow about 1.2 percentage points higher in the following years.
Structural policies and institutions. All variables related to struc-
tural policies present coefficients with expected signs and statistical
significance. Economic growth increases with improvements in educa-
tion, financial depth, trade openness, and public infrastructure. It de-
creases when governments apply an excessive burden on the private
sector. These results are broadly consistent with a vast empirical lit-
erature on endogenous growth, including Barro (1991) on the role of
education, trade, and government burden; Dollar (1992) on trade open-
ness; Canning, Fay, and Perotti (1994) on public infrastructure; and
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) on financial depth.
Perhaps surprisingly, we find that governance does not have a sta-
tistically significant impact on economic growth, and the correspond-
ing coefficient even presents a negative sign. This is so despite the fact
that among the proposed explanatory variables, the governance index
has the second largest positive correlation with the growth rate of per
capita GDP.21 Dollar and Kraay (2002b) obtain a similar result: vari-
ous measures of governance become insignificant in their growth re-
gressions when they control for trade openness. We interpret these re-
sults as saying that the effect of governance on economic growth most
likely works through the actual economic policies that governments
implement and maintain.
Stabilization policies. For the variables in these categories, all esti-
mated coefficients carry the expected signs and statistical significance.
Economic growth generally decreases when governments do not carry
out policies conducive to macroeconomic stability, including the ab-
21. To check the robustness of this result, we replaced the ICRG index with
each of its components in turn, namely, the indicators on bureaucratic efficiency,
corruption, law and order, and accountability. We also replaced it with Gastil’s
index on civil rights. The estimated coefficients were never statistically signifi-
cant, although the coefficient sign became positive for some governance proxies
(law and order and bureaucratic efficiency).19 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
sence of financial and external crises. Like Fischer (1993), we find that
an increase in the inflation rate leads to a reduction in economic growth.
The volatility of the cyclical component of GDP also has a negative
impact on the growth rate of per capita GDP. This reveals an impor-
tant connection between business cycle factors and economic growth, a
subject seldom explored in the endogenous growth literature. Our re-
sults in this regard are consistent with the theoretical and empirical
work by Fatás (in this volume).
The overvaluation of the real exchange rate is also negatively related
to economic growth. This is explained by the misallocation of resources
away from export-oriented sectors and the risk of balance-of-payments
crises that real exchange rate overvaluation entails. Finally, the frequency
of systemic banking crises has a negative effect on economic growth. This
effect is particularly large, as it indicates that countries that experience a
continuous banking crisis over, say, a five-year period suffer a slowdown
in their annual growth rate of almost 3 percentage points.
External conditions. Negative terms-of-trade shocks have the ef-
fect of slowing down the economy’s growth rate. This result is consis-
tent with previous studies. Easterly and others (1993), for instance,
find that good luck (in the form of favorable terms-of-trade shocks) is as
important as good policies in explaining growth performance over me-
dium-term horizons (such as decades).
Regarding the period shifts (or time dummies), we find that world
growth conditions experienced a gradual change for the worse after the
1960s, with the biggest downward break occurring at the beginning of
the 1980s. Broadly speaking, the deterioration of world growth condi-
tions between the 1970s and 1980s leads to a decrease in a country’s
growth rate of about 1.5 percentage points. Considering only world
growth conditions, our results indicate that any country in the sample
is expected to grow almost 3 percentage points more slowly in the 1990s
than in the 1960s. This is a considerable effect. After noting the world
growth slowdown after 1980, Easterly (2001) concludes that worldwide
factors are partly responsible for the stagnation of developing countries
in the last two decades despite policy reforms.
4. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS VOLUME
As mentioned, the article by Sala-i-Martin reviews the economic
growth literature of the last fifteen years and thus provides the academic
context for the volume. Most of the studies included therein apply to all
countries, particularly in the developing world. Some studies, however,20 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
provide specific applications to Chile or use this country for illustration
of general issues. For didactical purposes, we divide the studies included
in the volume into five groups. The first addresses the characteristics
and causes of economic growth from an international perspective. The
second undertakes the analysis of the relationship between business cycles
and long-run growth. The third group analyzes the role that specific
public policies may play in promoting economic growth. The fourth con-
siders the relevance of the financial sector for economic growth and de-
velopment more generally. Finally, the fifth group of papers derives a
number of lessons from the Chilean experience, which can be useful for
understanding the path of other developing economies.
4.1 Causes and Characteristics of Economic Growth
William Easterly and Ross Levine’s paper describes what the au-
thors believe are the most salient characteristics of economic growth
as it happens around the world. The first is that the differences in
economic growth across countries are explained not by the rate of capi-
tal accumulation, but by the growth of productivity. The second is that
the levels of per capita income in different countries do not tend to
converge—that is, the gap between rich and poor countries has wid-
ened in the last decades.22 While Easterly and Levine’s finding of abso-
lute divergence across countries is not optimistic, their conclusion that
growth does not occur randomly, but responds to the quality of public
policies is more encouraging. In this paper, the authors also seek to
identify the theoretical models that best match the stylized facts. They
favor the models that emphasize the growth in productivity, such as
those of increasing returns, technological innovations, and externali-
ties. Easterly and Levine recognize, however, that empirical studies
have not yet advanced sufficiently to be able to discern among different
concepts of productivity growth.23 They pose this as a challenge for
future theoretical and empirical work.
Rómulo Chumacero offers an alternative view on the issue of abso-
lute convergence, and he questions the interpretation of the statistical
22. This finding of absolute divergence is not inconsistent with conditional
convergence, which requires that the analyst control for policies and other growth
determinants before assessing whether growth diminishes with the level of output.
23. Parente and Prescott (2000) provide an alternative mechanism through
which policies can explain the observed differences in productivity levels and
growth. Their evidence suggest that policies in low productivity economies usually
inhibit technical progress in order to serve interest groups that extract rents from
privileged positions.21 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
evidence on the subject. His paper starts by reviewing the empirical
tests that have been used to demonstrate or reject the finding of income
convergence across countries. Chumacero then asks how effective these
tests are in detecting convergence in data generated by models in which
by construction there is convergence. He designs his experiment by
formulating stochastic growth models (that is, with random productiv-
ity shocks), generating artificial data from them, and applying the usual
convergence tests to these data. Revealingly, Chumacero finds that very
often, statistical tests incorrectly reject convergence across countries,
particularly when productivity shocks are persistent and somewhat
volatile. Apart from its cautionary message regarding convergence, this
result should alert researchers to the limitations of empirical tests de-
signed from nonstochastic models and encourage the inclusion of sto-
chastic elements in growth models. In this regard, Chumacero’s con-
tribution is an interesting empirical complement to the reservations
expressed by Steven Durlauf (in this volume) with regard to the policy
interpretations derived from cross-country regression results.
Robert Barro’s study links economic growth to the general process
of development. Using the cross-country framework for which he is
renowned, Barro examines the economic, social, and political elements
that accompany economic growth, whether as its causes or consequences.
These aspects of human development determine the quality of people’s
lives and are, consequently, the ultimate objectives of public policy and
private actions. Economic growth that promotes human development
can thus be considered high quality growth. Barro’s study attempts to
measure the quality of economic growth by examining its relationship
with socioeconomic variables (such as life expectancy, fertility, income
inequality, and environmental degradation), political variables (such
as democracy, rule of law, and corruption in the public administra-
tion), and cultural and social variables (such as criminality and religi-
osity). The importance of Barro’s study is that it gives a human and
social face to mere economic progress.
The paper by Steven Durlauf provides an interesting critique of the
use of growth regressions to derive policy implications. The author chal-
lenges the conventional interpretation of empirical results, arguing that
current econometric practice has yielded a body of evidence that is not
policy relevant. Extending his own previous work, Durlauf raises two
issues of critical importance for policy purposes.24 First, policy recom-
mendations arising from growth regressions are usually based on the
24. See, for example, Brock and Durlauf (2001).22 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
statistical significance of some regression coefficients, which does not
necessarily constitute a valid evaluation of alternative policy trajecto-
ries. Moreover, the statistical significance of a parameter does not pro-
vide information on the relative merit of the parameter for the objec-
tives of policymakers. Second, growth regressions as conventionally
constructed do not provide credible evidence of economic structure. Con-
sequently, policymakers are unable to make better decisions based only
on regression results. Durlauf proposes an alternative approach to the
interpretation of growth regression based on Bayesian averaging tech-
niques, which allow the weighting of different growth determinants
relative to the payoff function of the policymaker and in the context of
model uncertainty (because the modeler does not know what growth
determinants must be included in a model or what forms of country-
level heterogeneity need to be accounted for in the model).
4.2 Business Cycles and Long-Run Growth
As explained in our brief review of growth determinants (section 3),
the processes of business cycles and trend growth are not independent.
The connection between the two processes opens up a number of inter-
esting questions for academic and policy analyses. Two studies in this
volume address some of these questions.
The paper by Antonio Fatás presents evidence from cross-country
empirical analysis that reveals an interesting and significant connec-
tion between cycles and growth. Fatás examines two main aspects of
this relationship. The first consists of a strong positive correlation be-
tween the persistence of short-term fluctuations and long-run growth,
which implies that business cycles cannot be regarded as temporary
deviations from a trend. One way to understand this correlation is that
business cycles affect long-run growth, and it is this explanation that
Fatás presents in a stochastic endogenous growth model. The second
aspect is the connection between business cycle volatility and growth.
The author presents robust empirical evidence that countries that suf-
fer from more volatile cycle fluctuations exhibit lower rates of economic
growth. Consistent with the evidence in Carkovic and Levine’s and
Caballero’s work (discussed below), Fatás finds that the negative effect
of business cycle volatility on growth is much larger for poor countries
or countries with weak financial development. Fatás also provides pre-
liminary evidence on the growth effect of different sources of volatility
related to monetary and fiscal policies, thus augmenting the paper’s
practical value for policymakers.23 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
While the linkages between cyclical fluctuations and long-run growth
pose a theoretical puzzle to scholars, they pose a much more pressing
challenge to policymakers, namely, to determine whether observed high
or low growth rates in GDP correspond to turning points in the busi-
ness cycle or long-term changes in the growth path of an economy.
Andrew Harvey’s article explores this issue and proposes a novel meth-
odology for separating out trends and cycles, which overcomes the well-
known limitations of standard filters such as those of Hodrick and
Prescott (1997) and Baxter and King (1999). Harvey’s method com-
bines unobserved components with an error correction mechanism and
allows the decomposition of a series into trend, cycle, and convergence
components. This provides insight into what happened in the past, en-
ables the current state of an economy to be more accurately assessed,
and gives a procedure for the prediction of future observations. The
methods are applied to data on the United States, Japan, and Chile.
4.3 Public Policies That Promote or Inhibit Growth
The problem of disentangling economic growth from cyclical fluc-
tuations is at the root of several dilemmas that authorities face when
choosing among different sets of policies. On the one hand, whenever
growth weakens and a country faces external shocks, it is common to
hear voices calling for a revision of the policies in place and recom-
mending new mechanisms to help the country cope with the hardships
of recessionary periods. A typical suggestion is that of enacting so-called
industrial policies that favor specific sectors. On the other hand, when-
ever growth resumes and a country enjoys a bonanza, the reforms that
should be implemented to guarantee future growth are easily postponed
or dismissed, under the wrong impression that the country has already
achieved its optimal economic structure. Industrial policies and the
need for second-generation (governance-related) reforms are the respec-
tive subjects of the papers by Marcus Noland and Howard Pack and by
Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara.
When countries undergo a stage of stagnation, government au-
thorities are increasingly pressured to embark on policies that pro-
mote specific industries and economic sectors. The experience of East
Asian countries is often cited as an example of the success of indus-
trial policies. Marcus Noland and Howard Pack exhaustively review
the experience of industrial policies in three successful East Asian
economies: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The authors focus on
two questions. First, were industrial policies indeed the engine of24 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
growth in these countries? Second, are their current economic stag-
nation problems a legacy of the same industrial policies? Noland
and Pack provide original and systematic evidence that, notwith-
standing industrial policies’ positive effects on industrial develop-
ment and international trade in certain sectors, they had at best a
minor contribution to the overall growth of East Asia. Moreover, the
implementation of industrial policies distorted the economic incen-
tives faced by the corporate sector. Industrial policies encouraged
firms to take undue risks and allocate their resources inefficiently,
given the policies’ implicit guarantees and explicit relative-price dis-
tortions. Industrial policies also pushed firms to devote an impor-
tant share of their human and financial resources to rent-seeking
activities. It is not surprising, then, to see the grave cases of corrup-
tion of public officials that occurred particularly in Japan and Ko-
rea. Noland and Pack end their paper by admonishing governments
to refrain from picking winners, an activity for which they are ill-
prepared, and to focus on growth-enhancing measures that do not
differentiate among sectors, such as improving primary and second-
ary schooling, building a large and efficient social infrastructure,
and promoting international technology transfer.
Industrial policies are only one component of the incentive scheme
faced by entrepreneurs when making investment and production de-
cisions. Surely a larger component for the majority of firms com-
prises the facilities and restrictions inherent in public laws and in-
stitutions. Harald Beyer and Rodrigo Vergara’s paper studies how
economic growth and, specifically, factor productivity are affected
by the structure of incentives in the areas of property rights, mar-
ket regulation, legal and economic institutions, and political stabil-
ity. The authors conduct their examination on two levels. First, they
use cross-country data to evaluate the effects of broadly defined gov-
ernance-related rules and institutions. Second, they discuss specific
incentives, regulations, and restrictions that affect firm investment
and productivity growth, using Chile as an example. Beyer and
Vergara’s objective for the latter part is to identify specific issues
and policies that can be improved in Chile at the macro- and
microeconomic levels. Even in a country as advanced as Chile in
terms of market-oriented reforms, Beyer and Vergara conclude that
further reduction in bureaucracy’s red tape, removal of certain ex-
cessive regulations, and improved opportunities to compete in exter-
nal markets can contribute to larger growth in the country.25 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
4.4 The Role of the Financial Sector
The financial system has two major roles in the economy. The first
is to promote sustained growth by channeling savings to profitable in-
vestment opportunities and monitoring firms to ensure the proper use
of such financial resources. The second is to protect consumers and
investors from the risks inherent in economic activity. The two papers
on the financial sector included in this volume deal, respectively, with
each of the major roles of the financial system.
Ross Levine and Maria Carkovic’s paper presents confirmatory evi-
dence on the growth-promoting impact of private banking and stock
market development. With the clear objective of identifying proper fi-
nancial policies, the paper also examines the commercial bank regula-
tions and supervisory practices that lead to banking sector develop-
ment. The authors thus use cross-country regression analysis to find
that the depth and activity of banking and stock market operations
have a large and significant effect on the growth rate of per capita
output. They also expand on previous work by Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2001) to show that bank regulatory and supervisory policies that sup-
port private sector monitoring of banks, impose few restrictions on bank
entry and activities, and curb the generosity of their deposit insurance
schemes achieve stronger banking development than do other policy
regimes. Taking Chile as an illustrative example, Levine and Carkovic
note that this country is an outlier in the regression analysis on the
connection between financial development and economic growth—Chile
has less liquid stock markets and lower levels of banking development
than other fast growing countries. This implies, first, that there must
be some impediments to the development of the financial sector in Chile
despite its relatively high level of income and growth and, second, that
the removal of such impediments should confer potentially large gains.
The analysis of regulatory and supervisory practices that lead to bank-
ing development serves as the basis for identifying potential problems
in Chile in this regard. The authors conclude that at least part of the
problem resides in the fact that Chile has comparatively few regula-
tions to encourage private sector monitoring, while at the same time it
imposes tight restrictions on bank entry and activities and provides an
overly generous deposit insurance.
Ricardo Caballero’s paper addresses the importance of financial
development from a different perspective. Caballero’s main concern is
reducing a country’s vulnerability to external shocks. Although the
paper focuses on Chile, it can readily be applied to small developing26 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
countries that face imperfect financial markets. The large domestic
macroeconomic imbalances that characterized the 1980s are no longer
a problem in most countries, yet the external sector remains a source
of instability. As Caballero argues in the case of Chile, the business
cycle in most small countries is driven by external shocks, such as a
decline in the terms of trade. In practice, these shocks have an effect
many times larger than predicted in the presence of perfect financial
markets. The financial system’s inability to limit the effects of exter-
nal shocks has large consequences over employment, income, and pro-
ductivity growth not only during the crisis itself, but also over the
long run. Caballero argues that the excess sensitivity to external
shocks is primarily a financial problem, in that, first, access to inter-
national financial markets contracts sharply precisely when the coun-
try needs it the most and, second, this access is distributed ineffi-
ciently among competing domestic borrowers. Caballero’s diagnosis
of the problem leads him to recommend a structural solution based on
two pillars. The first is the formation of institutions that are condu-
cive to the development of the domestic financial system and its inte-
gration with international markets. This is a long-run solution that
may take many years to implement, such that it requires a comple-
mentary solution to be applied right away. The second pillar, to which
Caballero devotes the most effort in the paper, is the design of an
appropriate international liquidity management strategy—specifically,
to encourage the private sector’s development of financial instruments
that are contingent on the country’s main external shocks. The Cen-
tral Bank could aide in the process by issuing a benchmark instru-
ment contingent on these shocks. In addition, the Central Bank could
design a countercyclical monetary policy with the main goal of per-
suading banks and investors to hold larger and more liquid foreign
asset positions in anticipation of crises.
4.5 Lessons from an Emerging Economy
As mentioned above, in the past twenty-five years, Chile has suc-
cessfully implemented substantial reforms to its economy. Neverthe-
less, growth faltered in recent years, raising a number of questions
that are addressed in the last set of papers. These questions relate to
three aspects that are of obvious interest to every emerging economy.
First, what is the engine of growth, and will it ran out of fuel in the
near future? Second, when facing adverse shocks, can monetary and
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sustainability of growth? And third, is it possible and useful to base
policies on the notion of potential long-run output growth?
As argued in the introduction, the welfare impact of economic
growth can be profound. Even small changes in growth rates can have
substantial welfare effects if they last over sustained periods of time.
An interesting example of these effects is Chile. Between 1960 and 1980,
GDP grew at a moderate average rate of 3 percent per year. Neverthe-
less, per capita consumption levels—and, to a large extent, welfare—
remained basically constant. The Chilean economy responded vigor-
ously to the promarket reforms of the late 1970s. Between 1980 and
2001, GDP grew at around 5.5 percent a year, while per capita con-
sumption levels nearly doubled and poverty levels halved. Since a num-
ber of countries have applied or are implementing reforms similar to
the Chilean initiatives, it is natural to ask why these reforms were so
successful. The paper by Francisco Gallego and Norman Loayza pro-
vides a simple, but powerful message: the most important factor be-
hind Chile’s success is that market-oriented reforms were implemented
strongly and jointly.
Gallego and Loayza’s paper applies the concepts and methodologies
of cross-country empirical analysis to an examination of the process of
economic growth in Chile. First, using a variety of methods ranging
from Solow growth decompositions to vector regression analysis, the
paper describes the main stylized facts of growth in Chile over the last
three decades. The authors highlight, in particular, the change that
occurred after 1985: growth in Chile jumped to a higher level, became
less volatile and more balanced across sectors, and featured a greater
role for productivity improvements. Second, Gallego and Loayza use
international evidence from regression analysis to explain what they
call the golden age of growth in Chile. Their model is able to explain
about 70 percent of the change in the growth rate from the period be-
fore 1985 to the period after 1985. According to the authors, the expan-
sion of growth in the golden age stems from improvements in human
capital, financial depth, government efficiency, public infrastructure,
and, most importantly, the joint implementation of public policies. For
the future, the paper identifies the importance of improving the quality
of education, expanding the provision of public infrastructure, and elimi-
nating excessive regulatory restrictions as the engines for renewed and
sustained economic growth.
Vittorio Corbo and José Tessada’s study provides a thorough revi-
sion of the post-1998 slowdown in economic growth in Chile. This was a
rather turbulent period in economic history, and as such, it provides28 Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto
ample space for speculation on the causes of the slowdown and its likely
solutions. The authors use an econometric model to test three compet-
ing hypotheses and derive general implications from the analysis. The
first hypothesis puts the blame on bad luck resulting from external
shocks: namely, terms-of-trade losses and a slowdown in capital in-
flows following the Asian crisis. A second hypothesis blames the slow-
down on policies implemented as a response to the deteriorating exter-
nal conditions, in particular the inability to achieve a balanced mix of
monetary and fiscal policy during the 1997–1998 period. Fiscal imbal-
ances and restrictive monetary policy, it is argued, led to very high
capital costs, thus reducing profitability and the incentives to invest.
Finally, a third explanation is that the slowdown resulted from the
completion of a high growth cycle associated with the structural re-
forms introduced in the 1985–1995 period. After a careful evaluation of
the econometric results, Corbo and Tessada conclude that the slow-
down in the Chilean economy was a mix of severe external shocks and
lack of cooperation between fiscal and monetary policies.
Gabriela Contreras and Pablo García examine different methodolo-
gies for the estimation of potential output levels and, consequently,
long-run growth rates. Beyond the technical aspects of these method-
ologies—which are thoughtfully discussed by the authors—the motiva-
tion for the paper lies with the importance of long-run growth esti-
mates for monetary and fiscal policies. This is of particular relevance
in an emerging economy (such as Chile) where the Central Bank pur-
sues an inflation target and the fiscal sector usually has to accommo-
date activity shocks. Under inflation targeting, the forecast path of
aggregate demand largely determines monetary policy; errors in esti-
mating the output gap or trend growth can misguide monetary policy
and jeopardize the achievement of the inflation target. Information on
the duration and nature of the shock is also vital for fiscal policy. For
instance, real shocks usually have significant effects on tax revenues
and, consequently, on fiscal deficits, and they should be accommodated
or not depending on whether they are transitory. Moreover, in coun-
tries that have adopted stabilization mechanisms (such as commodity
funds) to smooth out cyclical fluctuations, their efficacy largely depends
on the ability to determine the magnitude and frequency of transitory
shocks, that is, to separate trends from cycles. Contreras and García’s
study provides key elements for correctly characterizing the shocks
hitting the economy and their effects on cyclical fluctuations and po-
tential output, which is essential for conducting proper stabilization
and growth-promoting policies.29 The Sources of Economic Growth: An Overview
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Economic growth is, and most likely will continue to be, one of the
most dynamic fields in economic analysis. The question of why most
economies in the world are not decisively moving toward a state of
development challenges both scholars and policymakers. Economic
theory has progressed enormously in the last fifteen years in explain-
ing the mechanics of growth. Its empirical counterpart has provided
substantial evidence on the relative importance of the different deter-
minants of growth across countries and on the role of policies in pro-
moting sustained progress. Nevertheless, our knowledge on important
aspects of the problem is still rather limited, and creative research is
badly needed in these areas.
This volume contributes to the field on two dimensions. First, it
extends the frontiers of our understanding about the determinants of
sustained growth, going beyond the realms of macroeconomic poli-
cies—such as stabilization and basic structural reforms—and into
areas dealing with microeconomic and regulatory policies, technologi-
cal adoption, market formation, and governance institutions. Second,
most of the papers in the volume focus on the intricate relationship
between long-run growth and cyclical fluctuations, and some provide
analytical models or statistical techniques that allow for a rigorous
analysis of how and when short-term fluctuations affect long-run
growth trends. In this volume, the recent experiences of several de-
veloped and developing countries—in particular, Chile—are dissected
and studied to provide further insights on and quantification of the
determinants of long-run growth and its relationship with business-
cycle fluctuations.APPENDIX A
Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in
Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and construction Source
Output
Real per capita GDP (in 1985
US$ PPP)
Ratio of total GDP to total population.
GDP is in 1985 PPP-adjusted US$.
Growth rates are obtained from constant
1995 US$ per capita GDP series.
Authors’ construction,




Initial output gap Difference between the log of actual GDP
and (the log of) potential (trend) GDP
around the start of the period. The
Baxter-King filter is used to decompose




Ratio of total secondary enrollment,
regardless of age, to the population of
the age group that officially corresponds
to that level of education.
World Bank (2002). Gross secondary-school
enrollment
Domestic credit to the
private sector (% of GDP)
Ratio to GDP of the stock of claims on
the private sector by deposit money
banks and other financial institutions.
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,
and Levine (2000).
Openness (% of GDP) Residual of a regression of the log of the
ratio of exports and imports (in 1995
US$) to GDP (in 1995 US$), on the logs of
area and population, as well as dummies
for oil-exporting and landlocked
countries.
Authors’ calculations,




Ratio of government consumption to GDP World Bank (2002).
Main telephone lines per
1,000 workers
Telephone mainlines are telephone lines
connecting a customer’s equipment to
the public switched telephone network.
Data are presented per 1,000 population





Governance (index) First principal component of four
indicators: prevalence of law and order,
quality of bureaucracy, absence of
corruption, and accountability of public
officials.
International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG)APPENDIX A (continued)
Variable Definition and construction Source
Stabilization policies
Inflation Measured by the consumer price index:
annual percentage change in the cost to
the average consumer of acquiring a
fixed basket of goods and services.
World Bank (2002).





Real effective exchange rate, with the
level adjusted such that the average for
1976–1985 equals Dollar’s (1992) index of
overvaluation (based on the ratio of
actual to income-adjusted Summers-
Heston purchasing power parity
comparisons).
Easterly (2001).
Systemic banking crises Number of years in which a country
underwent a systemic banking crisis, as
a fraction of the number of years in the
corresponding period.
Authors’ calculations,
based on data from
Caprio and Klingebiel
(1999) and Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999).
External conditions
Terms-of-trade shocks Log difference of the terms of trade.
Terms of trade are defined as
customary.
World Bank (2000).
Period-specific shift Time dummy variable. Authors’ construction.APPENDIX B
Sample of Countries
The database is constructed of observations from a five-year panel sample for the period 1961-1999. The
sample includes seventy-nine countries, but not all countries have observations for all of the subperiods. The
table below shows the available observations per country and time period. The first two observations per country
are reserved for differencing and serve as instruments. The regression sample thus comprises 350 observations
in levels and an equal number in first differences.
Period














Congo, Democratic Rep. of the (Zaire) xxxxxxAPPENDIX B (continued)
Period
Country 1961–1965 1966–1970 1971–1975 1976–1980 1981–1985 1986–1990 1991–1995 1996–1999


















Iran, Islamic Republic of xxxxx
Ireland xxxxxxxx
Israel xxxxxxxxAPPENDIX B (continued)
Period



















Papua New Guinea xxxxx
Paraguay xxxxxxxx
Peru xxxxxxxxAPPENDIX B (continued)
Period










Syrian Arab Republic xxxxxxx
Thailand xxxxxxx
Togo xxxxx
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